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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
lWBJ<~l{'f' JACK

HAUETER and

PHYLLlS HAUETER, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellant:;,

Case No.
10888

V8.

LIDA C. PRINCE, et al.,
Def e11dant and Bc:;J_Jondeut.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Aweal and Cross-Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Joseph Jeppson, Judge

N1',\'J1EJ\IENT OF
'I'his is
tnent hons<>
iu tl1t forrn
William H.

TIU~

KIND OF CASE

an adion by plaintiffs as buyers of an apartundt>r a uniform real t:>state contract couched
of foreil>le Pntry ag-ain::;t Lida C. Prince and
Prinee Estak (R. 17-18) Defrndant Lida

2
C. Prince counterdaimed and crm;sclai11wd HP(•king

t11

terminate the interest of plaintiff and the othPr defrn<lants in and to the apartment house by reason of tlu•i1
default under the unifonn real estate contract and for
money damages for wrongful conversion by sueh parti1·~
of personal property. (R. 27-30)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court terminated all interl•sb of all
defendants except defendant Lida C. Prince in and to
the apartment house, gave judgment to plaintiffs, declaring that plaintiffs' interest in the apartment house ha<l
not been effectively terminated and that plaintiff wa~
to be given possession of the apartment house and that
Lida C. Prince had unlawfully detained the premi~e~.
but there were no damages. The Court further vested all
interests of plaintiff under the contract in plaintiffs'
trustee in bankruptcy and gave judgment to Lida C.
Prince declaring plaintiff to be in default under tho
uniform real estate contract and declaring that sixty
days was reasonable time for plaintiffs to have to curP
the dt>faults and if the defaults were not cured the con
tract could be tenninated by seller Lida C. Prince.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Lida C. Prince on her cross-appt>al Sl'Pb
to rPvenw the District Court in its conclusion of unlawfnl
detainer and seeks to reverse thP District Court in

it~

')

•)

ct1nclrnsiou that the uniform real estate eontract had not
been (:'ffrdiwly terminated by the written notice of
default and plaintiff's failure to cure the default. That
failing, Lida C. Prince seeki'i to uphold the Court's finding ()f no damages and that sixty dayi'i was reasonable
time for plaintiffs to cun· the defaults.
S'l'AT1£l\ll£NT OF FAC'L'8
I' lain tiff Ho he rt .Jack Hauetl>r (then a single man)
1111 thl' 1-1-th <la)· of l\larch, 1960 t•ntered into a uniform
real e11tate contract to purchase from "William H. Prince
(no\\· de('(•ased) and Lida C. Prince, his wife, an apart111Pnt house locatPd at 248 vVest Fourth North, Salt
Lake City, P tali. ( R. 87) 8orne time thereafter plaintiffs executed ini'itrmuents in connedion with said
prnperty to Equitable Corporation and others, which
conve.rnnces are not matl>rial to this appeal. (R. 88)

Plaintiffs as purchasers defaulted on said uniform
n·al estate contract in that: (1) 'l'hey permitteed waste,
spoil and destruction on the premises and failed to maintain 11aid lll'Pltlises in a good eondition (R.. 89); (2) They
failed to pay the taxes ( H. ~9-90) ; and ( 3) they failed
to mah the monthly payments of $475.00 due on the
first of l'ach month for the months of 8eptember, 196-.!
and each and ewry month then·after, to the date of
Judgment. (R. 90) On or about Nov0111ber 2-±, 1964 plaintiffs J'P<·t>i\'t><l \\'ritten 11otict· from defendant Lida C.
l'rin<·t·'s attunH·)·, infonlling tht,lll of tlw above referredto (IPfaulb and dPdaring that tht>ir rights under tht>

uniform real estate contract had been tenninatPd in
accordance with Paragraphs 16(a) of such uniform real
t·statt• contract. (R. 90) On or about November 2-1:, 19G-t
Lida C. Princ1~ reciuested Laverna 8cofield, agent oi
plaintiffs at said apartment house, to pay thP n•nhi frnt11
the apartment house to defendant Lida C. PrincP, wl1iC'L
l\[rs. Scofield did. (R. 76)
Plaintiffs moved to the state of Orngon in .~11ril
of 196-! (R. 76, 247, 248) and mailed their month!~· payments from Oregon to .Mrs. Prince. After the pay llMll
for August, 19fi4, which arrived August 20, 196-! (R ±31,
432) l\1rs. Prince heard nothing further from plaintiff~
until this lawsuit was commenced in April of 1965. (R.
432) Plaintiffs contend that approximately Decemlwr
20, 1964 they contacted Mrs. Prince requesting lwr to
give tlwm an accounting of the rents from the apartnwnt
house. (R. 307) Plaintiffs did not ask Mrs. Scofield, the
agent at the apartment house, for the rents, (R. 271,
274) and l\1rs. Prince and Mrs. Scofield deny that plaintiffs ever contacted them during the period in c1uestiot1
(R. 394, 432) but the Court made a finding that plaintiffs did contact ~frs. Prince about December 20, 19G+
and she failed to yield to the request for more than
three days. (R. 91)
On April 15, 1965, (R. 17, 18) plaintiffs auwnde<l an
action that had been pending for nearly two year;:;, (R
1-3) claiming that l\1rs. Prince had forcibly (•ntl·r<'d the
apartuirnt hous<'. (R. 17) After four separat" p!T-trial
eunferenees on the matter from May 9, l!)()(i to ~epten 1 -

lwr Ii, H}(j(j (H. 7-±), the pre-trial judge entered the

pre-trial ordN listing plaintiffs' claim for an action of
lidvih!P entr>· (R. 75) and made a determination that
i1aintiffs had no t>videnct• to produce at trial and that
1
i 1·a:-11nahk minds rnuld not differ concerning the facts
aml al'eording!)- di."l111issed plaintiffs' claim for forcible
11tr:· ll'ith prt>judic<:>. (R. 76) The pre-trial judge set
1lrl\rn for trial onl)- three issues of the case: (1) Def1·1Hlant Lida C. Prince's counterclaim that plaintiffs'

in tlw n~19nn
prop1•rly M-I~\itik; (2)

real estate contract had been
plaintiffs' claim that the termination 0f tlH• eontract resulted in an unreasonable forfPiture amounting to a penalty rather than liquidated
lamagPs; (3) defendant Lida C. Prinee's contention on
th1 ('Olln\pn•laim that plaintiffs wrongfully converted
it1·1Jl~ of lJPnmnal property. (R. 77, 7S) The pre-trial

i11tPre~t

1

jurlg1• ordt>r<:>d that all pleadings be rnerged in the pre-

trial order and that no amendments be permitted thereto

for good eam:;p shown and to prevent manifest
rnjuRtice. (R. 78)

<V'P]lt

Jt tltt> trial tlw trial judge over the objection of
111

hwl for Lida l'. Prinee p1,nuitted as one of the issues
'
lrir<'ih!P Pntry
'·"> 1.:><>
'''J) 111le lllatter was tried
. · (R . 1oJ-,
liefon· the Comt without a jury and the Court held,
atuong· 0th
ti .
Pr 11ngs: ( 1) 'l'hat tlw notice of default
~i\1•11 :\\J\'('lll)H•r ~ +, 19()+ \\"HS not sufficit>nt to effectively
11·n11inut
ti 11
,
''
' t·ontrnd; (~) 'L'hat defendant Lida C.
l 11%· unJ· f ll
.
ai\ n Y cldamt'd thl· premises frolll plaintiff;

""
'

(j

( 3) That the cost of maintenance of the premises \I a>
to lw dednded from the rents to determine what, if any,
damages and that the rnaintenanct' costs had exr<·edpd
the n•nts, then· fore thf::'re were no damages to ass<'ss; and
( 4) that plaintiffs wen• in default and the Court liPtPrmined that sixty days was reasonable time for })laintiff"
to cure their defaults, after which defendant Lida C'.
Prince as seller eould effeetively terminate plaintiff',
interest in the contract.

Appellants appeal from 3 and .f above and 1·pspundl'nt appeab from 1 and 2 above. Respondent S<'eks tl1i,;
('Ourt to rPn'rse the judgment of the Distrid l'omt
and declare that the said uniform real estafr C'ontract
had been effectively terminated and that there was no
unlawful d0tainer, and that failing, respondent n•qnPst'
this Court to sustain the District Court's defrnnination
that sixty days was reasonable time for plaintiffs to cure
thP d0fault and that maintenance and opPration coRts
were pro1wrly dedueted from the rents to determinl'
damages, if any.

AHGl"MENT
POINT NO. I

THE PARTIES PROSECUTING THIS APPEAL HA \'E
NO INTEREST IN THE APPEAL AND ARE THEREFORE
NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF.

Tlw judgment in this ease vests all interest of plaintiffs in th<'ir trustt>e in bankruptcy who residt•s i11 ()rpgon.
(H.101)

-L\ C..J.S. 51.f provides:

"'l'lw n•cord 11rn::;t ::;ho\\· that the }Jen;on seek-

1n o· to brino· tlH· appellate proceeding is a proper

JH~·t:-' tlwn~o and has a right to maintain it....
Om· C'annot tw considered an apptdlant when•
then· i,; nothing of rernrd to :,;ho\\· an appeal h>·
Jiirn, and ,;(atf'lllPnb in hrid::; that he has appealed
\\·ill be ignored."
The applicahh~ law i::; ::;tated in Alman c. Americwt
('ar/u{((//11g Corporutio11, :380 Ill. 52±, -!:± N.E. 2d 592,
:1!1~, where the Court held an attorney could not prosernt1· the ap1H·al on hi::; O\rn. TlH· Court de::;cribed the
intt>n•,;t 1d1id1 tlH· appellant must have:
'' ... rrhat interest must be such as to make

it ap1H'ar that he takes or loses something directly

hy the judgnH·nt or decree he challenges." (Citations omitted)

};pither the Haueten; nor the attorney for Haueters
hare srn:h an intPrest and the record is devoid of any
appeal by the trustee in bankruptcy, who is the only
Jiarty that take::; or lmws :-;orndhing directly by the judglilent.

POINrL1 N 0 II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERED
AND ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THE ISSUE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

Tlt1· 1n·e-trial judge, thP I lonorable Leonard W.
l:Jton • \'\'I'\'. ("\I'
.· [ e1 . t't ] ti t1· .1:-;:-;ue:-; o f" t} u;,;
. a(• t'·1011
, P f'1tJ[\·
. c·o11:-;1(
;

11

"r

four tliffrrt'11t pn·-trial l'o11f'l'n·11t.:t·::-;, uvt•r a ]Jeriod
four lllontlrn' time, a11d thl'H l'.onduded as follows.

8

"Plaintiffs' second caust~ of action allC'ges an
action of forcible entry against defendant Lidu
C. Prince in reference to said apartment 110use.
Ddendant Lida C. Prince resists said claim. Dming the several pre-trial conferences, counsel fu1
plaintiff and counsel for defendant rnadP .otipulations of the following material facts in conm•1'.tion with the alleged forcible entry:
"That vlaintiffs were _purchasing said apattrndent house from defendant Prinee. l\lore than
seven months prior to November 2-±, 19G-± plaintiffs moved to the State of Oregon, making
arrangenH'nts with one of the tenants in the apartuwnt 110m1e, Laverna Scofield, to collect tlw rent
from the tenants in the apartment housP, and she
was to give the rents to the sister of the plaintiff,
Phyllis M. Haueter, when said sister came hy to
pick up the rents. Laverna Scofield continued to
deliver the rents to plaintiff's sister whenev<>r
she came by except for the months of September
and October and November, 196-±, when plaintiffs'
judgment creditor, l\Ir. Gilroy, garnished the
rents. On November 2-±, 19G-±, defendant Lida C.
Prince sent a letter to the said Laverna :Scofield
informing her that plaintiffs had defaulted on
tlwir eniform Real Estate Contract, and that
future rents were to be paid to defendant Lida
C. Prince. The said Laverna Scofield complied
with said request, and paid future rents to defendant Lida C. Prince. Defendant Lida C. Prince
has never physically occupied the pn_•111ises, nor
has she changed the method of operation of tlw
apartnwnt housP. Said Laverna ScofiPld has ('Olltinw·d to <·ollt•d the n-"nts, and the onl.\· dianµ:·.·
hat-1 been that ::-:he has iiaid the rents to d\-'l'l'IHlalll
Lida C. Prince instl·ad of to plaintiff's sister.

"'l'lwn' i::; no evidenee that ean be produced
at trial to show any force, threats or duress by
Lida C. Prince against Laverna Scofield. Defendant Lida C. Prince conten,d~~jf p~aintiff
1-Iaueter::; have never made a ~H
with her
since August 21, 1964 (when the last payment
was sent to her) until this action was commenced.
Plaintiffs eontend that there ·was some demand
made on Lida C. Prince for the return of the
pn~mises by the plaintiffs but were unable to
recite any evidence that eould be presented at the
trial to prove such contention.
"Based on the sti1mlation by the parties of
tlw material facts, the court believes that reasonable minds could not differ concerning the fact,
and that, accordingly, plaintiffs do not have a
cause of action for forcible entry. The court
orders plaintiffs' claim for forcible entry be and
th(' same is hereby dismissed with prejudice."
(R.

76)

The correetnes::; of the trial court's ruling is subl'tantiakd by the case of Labco Construction Company
1. Caldwell, 1± Utah 2d 254, 382 P. 2d 206. In that case,
as in the instant matter, the plaintiff at pre-trial could
not indieak any evidencP on the i::;sue and the pre-trial
judge " ... 11oignantly observed that 'if you haven't got
nn~- Pvidt'nce on it, I am not going to put it down as
an is~nw,' and dismissed as to Ross." The Supreme
Court of Utah in unanimously upholding the pre-trial
.1udgp'::; ruling stated:
"l<'or thi:-; Court to rever:-;p the trial court
undt>r sueh <'i n·umstanePs would deify a mockery
uf our rules and pre-trial procedure."

1U
Likewi::;e in the instant matter, it wa::; 1110ek('JT uf
our rules and pre-trial procedure for the trial judgt> 1u
owrrnle the prP-trial judge and con::;ider an issup tliat
had alread~- !wen fully considt>red and dt>tenuiMd h)
the pre-trial judge. At the trial the following L'Xtliang1·
occurn'd in regard to the issue of forcible pntn·: (R l:l~.

133)

'!'HE COUR'l': " ... lt is the furtl1Pr filldlllµ:
of tlw court that the pre-trial judge enh·n'd all
orclPr that the forcible entrv matter should ilt'
dismis:wd; that following said order, he consl'IJtPrl
that tlw matter be reheard by this eomt at the
hearing.
·
'"l'hP court has determined to hear the issue
of forcible Pntry. You may take what steps ;·on
wish.

''MR. McKAY: Your Honor, 1 \rnuld lik11
to take l'XCPption to the Court's ruling in n'ganl:i
to . . .
"MR. MINER: Forcible detainer, not forr-

ible entry.

"THE COURT: We call it forcible en fr)·
and detainer. I do not see your point.

"MR. MINER: All right.
"'l'llE COURT: I think this "·ill lw pntn"
However, proceed."
Then' is no basis for the trial court's stateJllt>nt
that tht' Jll'P-trinl judge tonst'ntecl that th(' rnatt .. r 11 1'
rl'!1t•ard, IH•(·ansv tla' }ll'e-trial judge did arnPnd i11 l1is p11n
hand\\'riting ont• of th(• issue::; (R 77) !mt wad" nu

11
(liange j 11 Jii:-: order dis111issing the claim of forcible
, trv. lf he had mad(' a change he would have so indi11
1;dc;l in bis pre-trial order. (R. H-78)

J>laintil'f's ;\ltH~nded complaint against
l'rinrT complains of on!; on<.> wrong:

Lida

C.

"That during tlH' month of April, 196-! the
defendant Lida C. Prince did wilfully and maliciously take po8session of said building and has
collected the rents therefrom. She has taken posm;sion \Yithout any right to do so." (R. 17)
Tlwn' is no alkgation in the amended complaint
alkging d(•mand or unlawful detainer. During the four
different prt>-trial confert>nct>s plain ti ff s still alleged
forcible l'ntry, which the pre-trial judge properly dismissed. Even at the time of trial the trial judge termed
the issm· as "unlawful entry." (R. 133) Surely it is
obvious error for the trial judge to conclude with a
finding and juclg111ent that defendant Lida C. Prince
\1a~ guilty of unlawful detainer when the is::me was
Heither allegt>d in the eomplaint nor was it asserted or
>d do\\'n as an issUL' in the pre-trial conferences, nor was
it listPd a:-; an i::-:8Ut' by th0 trial judgt>. Somehow during
the trial the plaintiffs switched from their claim in their
u111end<'d complaint of forl'.ible entry during the month
1
' 1':\ pril , 1%+ ( H.17)
to unlmd'ul clt>tainer t->ometiuw in
u~11·111hpr of 1%+. (Parngrnpli lli, K ~Jl) (;~VPll if h,Y
''JIJH· ~trdd1 of th(• irnagiuation tl10 i:-;sue of unlawful
il"tainer \\'a::; pro1H'rly lwfon· thl' trial court, the fads

1:2
a:,; ::-;tipulated by the partie:,; (R. 7G) a:,; LlUOtPd from tlw
iire-trial order above certainly do not warrant a finding
of unlawful detainer.
'J'lw only PvideneP prndueed at trial on tlw 1:,;:,;rn· pf
unlawful detainer was a disputed ::;tatem<mt by Robert
Jack Haueter that he said to Jl.Irs. Prince: "l want an
accounting of the rPnt, and I want the aparhnent hons<·
hack." (R. 307) Even .Mr. Haueter admit:,; that J\lrs.
Prince did not refuse him but merely askPd him to go
see her attorrn•y. ( R 307) l\fr. Haueter further admits
that he did not eontaet l\Irs. Prince's attorney. ( R. :307)
In fact, when asked about 'rhether he had ever be<'ll
refu:,;ed po:,;:,;e:,;sion the exchange wa:,; as follow:,;:

'"Q. ·wlwn you asked for the apartment lwmw
back, what did you mean by that'!

""A.

I preswned she had posses:,;ion.

''Q.

And did she deny you that you this possession 1

"A.

No, she referred rne to you.

"Q.

She never denied you any po:,;session?

""A.

No."

did :,;he deny

(R. 309)

8uch admi:,;:,;ion by Mr. Haueter conelu:,;ively eliwinates any basis for unlawful detainer, especially in tllf'
light of the stipulated facts that l\Irs. Prince newr
physically occupied the premises. (R. 76) 'T'he only
thing l\Irs. Prince did was write a letter to l\lr. Haneh·r's
agent, Mrs. Ncofidd, wl10 was living at the }Jl'elllis<·S
and collt>ding tht> rPnts and n•questt>d Mrs. Seofiel<l

g·i\'(' ~In;. Prirwe thv n·nb because of Haueter's de-

111

lanlt. ,\Jr. llauetL·r adlllib that he never contacted Mrs.
:-;(·ofiPld about th(' n·nb (R :271) and admits he was
11 1·\'L'l' rdusL·<l a(huission to the apartrn('nt house. (R. 271)

If tit(· ahove :stakuwnb of .3lr. Haueter were not
1·nougli to Pra:se any ('laim for unlawful detainer, surely
tlil' following llUestion and answer an· conclusive: (R.

n5)

"(2.

Ml'. Hauetl'l', l am asking you the question,
did you ewr try to takP physical possession
of this apartment house, after August 1,
1964?"

"A.

No."

'l'ltv 111ost that (·an bv said is that Mr. Haueter claims
111 Jmvt> m;ked l\lrs. Prince for an accounting of the rents
IR. 27-J.) his agtmt, Mrs. 8cofield, was giving to the Sheriff nndPr garnishment of l\Ir. Gilroy, Haueter's judgment
1·1wlitor up to November, 1%-J. (R. lGO-lGG) (which garnil'h11w11b wPre known to plaintiffs (R. 249, 310) and to
jlrs. l'rinc(• after N owrnht>r :24, 1964. (R. 76) Surely
011elt eould not Jw l'on:struNl as unlawful detainer.

'rhe Court's attPntion is also callt>d to tlw agreement
l1dwet>n the plaintiffs as Buyer and defendant, Lida C.
PrineL', as Seller wherPin paragraph lG (a) of said
l 'nifonu RPal Estate Contrnd plaintiffa m; Buyt>r agreed
that if Bu_\Pr faik(l to J"t>lllPdy Jpfault \\'ithin five (5)
<la>:-; al'tl·r n·cl'i1Jt of \HitlL·11 notieP, 8Pller rnay at his
''i tio11 n·-L·nfrr and tak(' po:sst>ssion of said premises
1

without legal processes ... the Buyer becoming at on~i·
a tenant at will of the Seller ... (Exhibit 2). WrittPll
notice was admittedly received by plaintiffs N ovelllb1·r
25, 19G4 (R. 2G7) and plaintiff admits that he nevvr
cured the dt>faults nor made any tender of cure of th1·
defaults at any time even to the date of judgment (R. +~O.
421) and the only response to the written notice of default even claimed by plaintiffs is that plaintiffs alleg;·
they contacted 1\Irs. Prince for an accounting of the
rents December 20, 19G4. (R. 307)
Certainly it was error for the trial court to hold that
it was unlawful for defendant Lida C. Prince to do th1•
very thing which plaintiff and defendant had agreed in
writing in their agreement.

POINT NO. lll
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS OF NOVEMBER 24, 1964 COMBINED WITH PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO CURE DEFAULTS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACT.

']'he trial eourt found that the said l'nifonu RPal
Estate Contract provides as follows:
"Hi. In the event of a failure to colll])ly with the
terms hereof by the Duyer, or upon failure of the
Buyer to make any vaylllPnt or ]Ja)'!llenb ,r)wn
the samP shall he<'m11e dut->, or within :-W day"
thereafter, the ~eller, at hi::; option shall haw tht'
following alternativt· n•medies:

13
",:\.

Seller shall have the right, upon failure of
the Buyer to remedy the default within five
days after written notice, to be released
from all obligations in law and in equity to
<'onvey said property, and all payments
which have been made theretofore on this
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to
the ;-.;eller as liquidated damages for the
non-performance of the contract, and the
Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his
option re-enter and take possession of said
premises without legal processes as in its
first and former estate, together with all
improvements and additions made by the
Buyer thereon, and the said additions and
improvements shall remain with the land,
become the property of tht> Seller, the Buyer
becoming at once a tenant at will of the
;-.;ellt·r. .. '' (R. 89)

rl'he trial court found plaintiff as purchaser had
defaulted on said Uniform Real Estate Contract in that:
(1) He permitted wa:,;te, spoil and destruction on the

]ll'Pllli:,;es and failed to maintain said premises in a good
l'Ondition (R. 89); (2) He failed to pay the real and
!IPl'60nal property taxes for several years (R. 89-90);
anrl (3) He failt•d to make the monthly payments of

$-1-7G.OO

(htP mi

the first of Pach month for tht> months

uf Se11ternlJl'l', 1~)()-1-, aml l'<t<.:h and t-wry month thert>after

to tl1e datt> of the judgwt•nt in this matter. (R. 90)

Hi

l\lr. Haueter clearly adrnitted that he recL•ived \\l'it
ten notice from defendant Lida C. Prince on "N overnlh·J
25, 196-t, notifying him of said defaults. (R. 2li7) On
pages -±20 and -±21 of the record Mr. Haueter clearh
and unequivocally admitted that afkr he reeeived thi'
letter notifying him of the defaults, he madP no efforl
to cure them:

"Q.

(Mr. McKay): After you receiwd thi8 lett~r
did you ever offer any uwm·;· to I\lr:"
Prince1

"A.

(Mr. Haueter) No. J figured tlw l'Pnt
had---

~he

MR. MINER: Just answer yes or no.
THE WITNESS: I am sorry. No.

"Q.

(Mr. McKay) After you received this lettu,
did you attempt to make any repairs in the
Prince Apartment House?

"A. No.
"Q.

After you received this letter did you ewr
attempt to pay any taxes on tht' Prin('!'
Apartment House~

"A.

No."

By Mr. Haueter's own testimony he adrnit8 that 1ll'
never made any tender to cure the defaults and that
aJJproxirnafrly onP month passPd twfon• ht• rnadl, n11 '
inquiry in regards to tlw aparb11P11t lwmw. By the tcnn'
of the contract he was required to cure an;· default~

11Jtli1n fin cla:-·:::; aftt•r receipt of \\Titten notice and his

lailun· to do so would result in a termination of his
1ight nncl<'r the contract. He was fully advised of the

,Ji.fanlb, lw 1n1s fully advist~d that Lida C. Prince as
<1·l!Pr had elecfrd to terminate his rights under the contract pmsnant to paragraph Hi(a) of the contract and
]11· faikd t() cme the defaults within the time specified
;11 tlw contract and therefore by the terms of the con1 rad all (If his rights had heL·n terminated.
avplicable law is stated in the case of Foxley
1. Rich, 35 lTtah 1G2, 99 P. 6GG, 672, where the Utah
~u1n·<'lll<' Court held that a buyer's interest had been
ll'1·clivel~· tNrninated. The court stated:
Till~

1

" ... ·wiwre the parties tlwmselves stipulate
ltat the re:mlt of a breach of a particular contract shall be, the courts ordinarily have no authority to impose othPr consequences than those
agreed upon .... "

11

The ahovl' rule \\'as again approved by this Court in
Ourn, 3G rtah 333, Ull P. 6-±5, G-±7.

Huse I.

rn

l'\'g"anl to the tiim· to he allowed buyer to cure
hfaults, see Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113
l'tah -t03, 195 P. 2d 7-±8, where this court considered
1
h1· adual time and not just the :::;tated time in the notice.
Plaintiffs had apprnxirnatPl~, onP month between the
ti1w· tl1l·.1 l'P("l'i VL'd tlH· not ice and tlH· time tlwy allege
111 lia1·(· 111adP <·ontact ll'ith Mrs. Prince. This court

1

l~

in the Stewart case held 23 days actual time (7 days 11 as
given in notice) was reasonable to cure over 11 monthly
delim1uent payments. In the Stewart case this court
also considered the faet that the lmyt>r vrobabl)· ('ouldn't
have cured the default even with longer tinw, whi('h
is also present in the instant case. 1\f r. Haueter admittPd
he could not make the payments due l\1 rs. Prince without
receiving the rents (R. -118) and the rents were bc-ing
garnished under a judgment of $39,999.00, (H. -n:i\
which would not he satisfied for a long tirnc.

A case in JJOint is Federal La11d Bank uf Berkeley
'V.

Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 121 P. 2d 398, 400, where tlm

Court held that a notice by the seller almost identical to
the notice given by seller Lida C. Prince in this case
did in fact effectively terminate the contract. 'rhe buyer
in that case argued that the notice had to state within
the notice that the seller had until a certain date to
pay arrearages. This Court refused such argu11wnt by
stating "Such is not th1:• contract nor is it the rule or
practice."

Seller Lida C. Prim·p hy tlw noticl' of Novernlwr

:2-t, HH.i-1- cuu1Jled \\ith Haut>h~r's failul'\' to

('Ul'e

tlw de

faults did in fact L•ffectiveh· terminate the l'ontract and

'

.
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n1t Mrs. Prinee in a position where an action for a writ

of possession would lit', hut inasmuch as Haueters were
11ot in possession, an action was not necessary and Mrs.

Prince peacPahl)· ohtained the n•nts from Haueter's
ilg1·nt, I\Lrs. S<'ofield.
See abo Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 12±, 270 P.
~d 4---1-:2, where this court sustained a judgment that held
that a huyer's interest had been terminated when he
failt>d to Clll'P the default within the time specified.
Tlw trial court apparently had the mistaken idea
tliat a second notice was required in order to terminate
the contract. A second notice would only be required if
.\frs. Prince were attempting to charge plaintiffs with
unlawful detainer. All Mrs. Prince is attempting to
clarify with the court is that the contract had been
1·ffrctively terminated. Possession and unlawful detainer
\\We not an issue because neither Mrs. Prince nor the
Haueters had possession of the premises. They both
merely accepted the rents which were collected by their
agent, .Mrs. Scofield, who resided at the apartment house.
1'lw record is completely devoid of any evidence of any
agTPement or any factual situation which would require
that tlw notice be for more than five days, as agreed
in tl11' l'(mtrnd. 'J 1herefort>, the contract was properly
l1·n11inatPd hy Lida C. Prinee an<l Haueters have no
l'ight, titlt> or inten•st under the contract or to the prop, rt~- and it was error for the trial court to hold that the

:2U

contract had not been effectively terminatc>d, and tJ 1,
trial court should be reversed and judgment should 1i1•
entered in favor of defendant Lida C. PrincL•, holdin~
that the contract had been properly terminatt·d and
plaintiffs have no rights under the contract.

POlN'f NO. L\'
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER FORMU·
LA FOR DETERMINING DAMAGES IF THE FINDING OF
UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS HELD TO BE PROPER

Finding No. 7 of the Court, which is not even
alleged by plaintiffs to be in error, found: "Plaintiff a>
purchaser defaulted on said uniform real estate contrad
in that he permitted waste, spoil and destruction of
the premises and failed to maintain said premises in a
good condition." (R. 89)
Finding No. 19 provides: ''The necessary expenditures for the maintenance of the premises expended by
defendant Lida C. Prince in the amount of $12,316.3i
exceeded the gross rents received from the apartment
house during such period, which amounted to $10,-±84.0L"
(R. 91-92) The Court in the previom; finding found that
"Defendant Lida C. Prince after N" ovember 2-1-, 19G-! mad~
certain repairs to the lJrernist>s, all of which wen• reason
ahle and neet•ssar~· repairs to the pn;111ises. Said repa!l'
amounted to a total of $12,31G.37 ." (R. 91)

:21

Tlw formula used by the Court in eomputing damag1·;,; is appan·nt in Condusion N" o. 10, where the Court
.i~drn·tPd
a1110u11t

tlw n·awnable necessary repairs from the

of n·nb reePived and eonduded inasmuch as the

rqinirs and rnaint<:>nance had exeeedt•d the rents that
iltl'l'l' \H'l'P

no damage::->. (R. 93) Paragraphs 6 and 7 of

th1· jndglltPnt (R 85) condusively sho"· in the judgment

lliat the same formula was used, i.e., deducting the
n·asonable and necessary repairs from the rents received
1luring the iwriod when .l'IIrs. Prince collected the rents,
to

d\'t(·i·rninv what, if any damages, had been sustained.
'l'hP vel')' ca::-;e which plaintiffs assert in their brief

dl·arly states that to be a correct formula. The Utah
SupremP Court in the case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah

rn,

292 P. 206, 211 held that the measure of damages

\\'as:

"1'he damage::-; which may be recovered in an
aetion ::-;uch a::-; thi::-; one are measured by the rule
that they must be the natural and proximate consequences of the act::-; complained of and nothing
more. Rents and profits or rental value of the
prPmisPs during dl'tPntion are included in damag·Ps. (Citations omitted) Jt is the rental value
of ilH· prPrnis\"S as a wltolP (an apartment hou::-;e)
ll'l1id1 is the lo:,;s suffen"d by plaintiff. Had she
lwen in pos:,;pssion durinb" the period complained

·)·)

of, the expense of management and 01wratiun
"'ould have been borne by her. rrhe n•asonalil··
value of the use and occupation would lie 111ark
up of tlw gross rental value of th<' seHral apartments, and deducting from sueh sum a im>pPr
allowance for sueh expenses as manag<'llll'nt, col
lection of rents, repairs, h<:·ating if at the cxpen,,c
of the operator of the house, allowanct> for vacancies, watt>r rates and such items, if ap1mipriatc
as applied to the operation of this apartrnf'nt
house. Such ex1ienses would be borne h.\' tlw p0rson operating the house, wheth('l' plaintifl'ti 01
defendants, and must be dt>ducted from tlte total
rents to arrive at a fair rental value of the wholP
liroperty. The wisdom of the rule is well illustrated by applying it to a hotel or office building. Certainly no one would contt>nd that the
fair value of an office building would be merely
the sum of the rental value of all t11e rentable
rooms . . . ."
Plaintiffs on their appeal ar_e attempting to hare
the court give them damages measured only on the rents
without ch•ducting the maintenance costs '.vhich the Ftali
Supreme Court, as above quoh•d, specifically held could
not be donE>.
Plaintiffs also ehallenge th<' rPasonablt>iwss and
necessity of thE rnaintenance co» ts. 'l'hP a pvlicable la 1r
is " ... that wl1en~ fimli11gs and judgJtH•11t are supported
lw. sulrntantial evidenet• ' thev
. eannot bL' disturbed ou

<i!J[ll'Cll."

~~7,

I

l'ulrnrc(·

I.

}Jitters, 1:2 Ctah :2d

ul,

3G2 P. 2<l

-!:2U)

Till' Court\; fimlings that the expenditures made by
J.ida l'. Prirn·t~ on said premise::; were reasonable and
JH'rl·ssar)· rl'pairs and maintenance i::; well ::;ubstantiated
h1· tlw record. Ii:ven plaintiff'::; witnes::;, Eli D. LeCheminant, who was qualified as an expert by plaintiff's
('nLms(·l, tt>t'tified that Apartiuent No. 2 needed a comJiide rPnovating job (R. 225); that regular operating
1•:qwnsPs alone without maintenance would be $2,367.00
i11·r yPar (R. :230, 231); and further frstified in regard
111 tlw r<>asonahlt•rn•s::; and nece::;sity of the repairn:
"Q.

Wlwn .''OU ::;a.'' defern•d ma.intenancl', what
do you mean1

"A.

T mean apartment::; neglected; they had to
go through all of them. In the past they
were m'glected and this Ja::;t year required
an excessive amount of work.

"l\f y only knowledge of that is I have seen
the Olll' apartment that has not been completely
redone, and all I can as::;ume is that the other
apartnwnts were in similar condition, now they
are in good condition."
(R. 235)
"\Lrs. :::lcofield, the part)' who livPd in the apartment

lions\• during all tirnt>s im}Jortant herein a.nd who was
'1 11 • ag·\·llt for plaintiff::;, S[H'l·ifieally tPstified of the need
1111 · 1IH· n·pai n; arnl 1nai1itenam·p and their reasonable11' ' '
( H. %:i-:1u~, :3:-l9-3~l5)

Mr. l~dward E. \Vestra, anot1wr PXpert of plaintiffs, testified in regard to expenses and that the out~i<l!·
painting alone would be $1,000.00 (R. 212, 213) Also
Lida C. Prince testified in detail of the condition 11 :
the a partrnent house November 24, 19()-± and !ht• n~tii
for repair. (R. 430-431) Donald R. Chisholm, a real
estate manager, testified of the expenses, (R. 379-383)
and identified Exhibit No. 16 which listed the expendi
tures and he identified them as maintenance Pxpern;es.
(R. 382) \Vayne Prince identified as maintenance co~li
(R. 384-385) Exhibits 13 and 14, which gives all th~
cancelled checks and attaches all of the vouchers, showing each expenditure and the person to whom it was
paid and for what purpose. The Court could easily and
did properly make the finding that the expenditnm
made, both as to amount and as to items, \Vere reasonabk
and necessary and proper deductions from any rent'
received in determining the measure of damages.
ln regards to the triple damages, it is ~rnfficient to
state that if there are no damages certainly tiipling no
damages cannot produce some damages.
POINT NO. Y
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERI\IINED THE
DEFAULT OF PLAINTIFFS AND THAT SIXTY DAYS WAS
A REASON ABLE TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO CURE THE
DEFAULTS.

Plaintiff-ap1w1la11t:-; in Point 111 ot' thPil' uril'f

t•ull-

tend that the Court Pned in granting the defrndant tlw

11glit tu charg(• tlH· idaintiffa interest and taxt•s during
i!li' ti1111· that thv (kfrnclant was in possession of the
[il'lllJCl't.\',

('OJJli'lltioH ull the i>art uf plaintiffs is eornplvt(·l:· without rnerit. 'l'he judgrnent entered by the
C'onrt on the l+th day of December, 1966 (R. 86) as
further lirnitecl by the deletions specified in the order
ril \larch 13, 1967 (R 112-113) has no charge against
iiJaintiffs for interest as allPged in }Jlaintiffs' Point No.
TII. 1'hP order of l\Iarch 13, 19G7 only found the amount
1.hw
of N" ovember 2+, 19G-1, which is hefore Mrs. Prince
,,Jitained an:· rents. The order reads:
:-\1wl1

as

"'l'lw Court finds and orders on stiplation by
the parties that the balance due and unpaid on
the uniform real estatP contract at issue in this
rnatter was $3'7 ,2+2.22 as of November 24, 1964,
including taxes and interest to said date." (R. 112)
Plaintiff is merely allPging something that is not in the
judgment, nor is there any computation where such inter1..,t and tax<·s being complained about are part of the
iudg111Pnt. Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to the amount
that was still due under the eontract and no determination was ewr made in th1, ,judgment by the Court in
1Pgards to amounts afkr Novernber :24, 196-1:. (R. 112)
lnasrnuel1 as th1~ d1•ter111ination of the amount owed
a~ li~· ;.;tipulation of counsel for plaintiffs, surely plainliff, l'annot eo111plain of thl' rpsult thereof.
11

ln n•gards to plaintiffs' Point I\" on ap1wal, tl 1,
Court ·was proper in setting sixty days as a reasonabli
time within 1Yhich plaintiffs must cure the default~ 01
b~~ a tenant at will. The record clearly indicates that
the trial court fully considered the rnath>r and the Comt
found:
"Upon motion of defendant and the Comt
having heard arguments of the parties, the Court
finds and orders that plaintiffs should have sixty
days from the date notice is given to thrm 1J1
defendant to cure the defaults and hring thr c·ontract up to date or the contract will be terminatrd
and the plaintiff-buyers will be tenants at will.''
( R. 112-113)
'l'he Court had before it the uniform real e~tatt
contract wherein the parties had mutually agrerd that
if the buyer failed to remedy the default within five day~
after receipt of written notice the seller was released
from all obligations in law and el1uity to convey the
property. (Exhibit 2) Surely that is a factor in deter·
mining the amount of time the defaulting buyer should
have in which to cure defaults.
'l'he Court was also aware of plaintiff's h·stimony on
pages 4-20 and -t-21 of the record where plaintiff unt>quirocably admitted that he had never tendered any cur"
of the defaults even by the time of trial.
It was appan~11t that plaintiffs wen· not waking all~
::-;erious efforts to make any tt>nder to cure default:,;, ew 11

:11 u )\'<ll':' ai'tvr tht> admitted ddault and nearly two
11·ar::; aft<'r n·ePipt of notice of the default. The Court
,]i(111ld abo not<' that the trial concluded October 7, 1966,
,,nd tht> Conrt gave the parties his judginPnt at that time.
Thl'n·fon·, plaintiffs knew of the court's ruling and knew
·ii' th1· <h·l'anlts and knew that they had to cure the
(Hanlts Oetoher 7, HHiG. 8uch was again confirmed by
t!1(' \\Titten judgment filed December 14, 19G6. (R. 84)
lln till' 13th clay of March, 1967, the Court put the final
tim<' limit 011 iilaintiff':,; continued defaults as sixty days
from t lw time 11otiee "·as given from Lida C. Prince to
plainti ['f's. ( Il. 112) Lida C. Prince gave the written
notii'P thl' 20th clay of 1\[arch, 1967 and the trustee in
hankrnpte:> ( tlw real party in interest) and plaintiff's
attorm·y n•eeiwd the same the 21st day of March, 1967
11ith the sixty days ending 1\lay 20, 19G7.

Plaintiffs had from October 7, 19G6 until May 20,
l'.lli/ in \\·hieh to eme the ddaults, "·hich is over seven
111l1ntlis.
l'li<· L:talt statutes give only six months for redemption of real property under either a mortgage (Rule
1
IH(fl(:l) F.C.A. 1953) or a trust deed. (78-37-7 U.C.A.
l~J.i:i) Snrt>ly the Court in the instant matter has not
···t an nnrPasonahle length of timP for curing defaults
11111·11 thP total till\\' allmn·d plaintiffs from the date of
!lld!!;Jlll'llt until the ti111v the contrad wa::; finally termin'1l1·d \\a:-> in <·xeess of the time allowed by statute for

redeeming property under a foreclrnmre. Hedernption
from foreclosure n•quin•s payment of the total rernaini 11 ~
balanee, whPn·as in this case plaintiffs WPn• on!)- 11 ._
quin·d to c·un· th\• defaults, \Yhieh \rn::; a :-;ulista11t1all
les::w r arnoun t.
Even though the time from the date of the \\'ritt1·n
order was less than six months, it was sixty days, whirl1
was far in excpss of the amount of time whiC'h had b1·1·n
agreed upon b~- the parties, i.e., five days, i11 1rhi1·!1
the buyer was required to cure the defaults after n·c'l'i)lt
of written notice. (Exhibit 2)
The Court's attention is called to Paragraph 9 nl
the judgment, where the District Court held:
"Defendant Lida C. Prince has not waiwd
any of her rights to requin~ timely perfonnane 1
of said Fnifonn Real Estate Contract from thi'
time forward." (R. 86)
A case in point is Pacific Development Cu. i·s. 8tc11art, 113 Ftah -1:03, 195 P. 2d 7-18, where this court in
considerino· n·asonable notiee eonsidered tlw adual ti1n 1
which the bunr had to cure the default and not ju~t
the time specified in the notice and hPkl that the actual
time of 23 days to cure muuProus monthly payrnenb 1n1'
reasonable.
/:)

'l'he Court in the said ~tewart easP abo eon~1'd ere''I
tlw factor that buy Pr never madc> any tender orcr :i

1

. 11;; iwriod of ti11H· and that buyPr was not in a position
111 1·nrP tltP d<>faults in any event, which factors are
1111·.-;pnt in tlw instant case. 'l'rustee in bankruptcy has
1111 111om'Y in tlw estatt' with which to cure the defaults.
\Yith tlwse factors prest>nt tlH· requirenwnt irnpost>d
"' tlt1• Court wa!'i pro]H'r and reasonabl<> and if anything,
\\rn l1·ni(•nt on th(• Jllaintiffs and ::should })l' upheld.
SUl\ll\fARY
Tlie parfa•:,; prosPeuting this appeal have no direct
~ntl·rt·si in tlw appeal, therefore are entitled to no relief.
The trial court should he reversed on its finding of
m1la\\'fnl dPtainer and this court should hold that the
nniform rPal estate contract was effectively terminated
11) ~el!Pr Lida C. Prince's notice of default::; and buyer
Haueter's failnre to Clll'\c' the defaults. That failing, this
11 1mt :slwuld uphold the trial conrt'ti finding that there
''l'l'I' no damages and thai sixty days was reasonable
•i111v for lmyl'l'S to cure the admitted defaults.
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